================================================================================ ACME CORP NETWORK TOPOLOGY — Firewall & Zone Architecture Document: NET-DIAG-2025-003 Last updated: 2025-10-01 ================================================================================ +-----------------+ | INTERNET | | (Untrusted) | +--------+--------+ | | Public IPs: 198.51.100.0/24 | +--------+--------+ | EDGE FIREWALL | | fw-edge-01 | +--------+--------+ | +------------------+------------------+ | | +--------+--------+ +--------+--------+ | DMZ | | VPN GATEWAY | | 192.168.10.0/24 | | 192.168.99.1 | | | +---------+-------+ | - Web servers | | | - Reverse proxy | Remote employees | - Mail gateway | & contractors +--------+--------+ | +--------+--------+ | INTERNAL FIREWALL| | fw-core-01 | +--------+---------+ | +------------+------------+------------------+ | | | | +---+----+ +----+-----+ +----+-----+ +------+------+ |INTERNAL| | DB | | MGMT | | DEV/STAGING | |NETWORK | | ZONE | | ZONE | | ZONE | |10.0.1.0| |10.0.2.0 | |10.0.5.0 | | 10.0.10.0 | | /24 | | /24 | | /24 | | /24 | | | | | | | | | |- App | |- MySQL | |- Ansible | |- CI/CD server | | servers| |- Postgres | |- Nagios | |- Test DBs | |- File | |- Redis | |- Jump | |- Sandbox | | server | | cluster | | box | | envs | |- LDAP | |- Backups | |- SIEM | | | +--------+ +----------+ +----------+ +------------+ ================================================================================ CURRENT FIREWALL RULES BETWEEN ZONES (fw-core-01) ================================================================================ SOURCE ZONE DEST ZONE PROTOCOL/PORT ACTION ------------------------------------------------------------------------- INTERNET --> DMZ TCP/80, TCP/443 ALLOW INTERNET --> DMZ TCP/25 (SMTP) ALLOW INTERNET --> DMZ ALL ICMP ALLOW INTERNET --> INTERNAL * DENY INTERNET --> DB ZONE * DENY DMZ --> INTERNAL TCP/8080, TCP/8443 ALLOW DMZ --> DB ZONE TCP/3306 ALLOW [!] DMZ --> DB ZONE TCP/5432 ALLOW [!] DMZ --> DB ZONE TCP/6379 ALLOW [!] DMZ --> MGMT ZONE * DENY DMZ --> INTERNET TCP/80, TCP/443 ALLOW DMZ --> INTERNET TCP/53, UDP/53 ALLOW INTERNAL --> DMZ TCP/80, TCP/443 ALLOW INTERNAL --> DB ZONE TCP/3306 ALLOW INTERNAL --> DB ZONE TCP/5432 ALLOW INTERNAL --> DB ZONE TCP/6379 ALLOW INTERNAL --> MGMT ZONE TCP/22 ALLOW INTERNAL --> INTERNET * ALLOW [!] DB ZONE --> INTERNAL * DENY DB ZONE --> DMZ * DENY DB ZONE --> INTERNET * ALLOW [!] DB ZONE --> MGMT ZONE * DENY MGMT ZONE --> INTERNAL * ALLOW [!] MGMT ZONE --> DB ZONE * ALLOW [!] MGMT ZONE --> DMZ * ALLOW [!] MGMT ZONE --> INTERNET * ALLOW [!] MGMT ZONE --> DEV/STAGING * ALLOW [!] DEV/STAGING --> INTERNAL * ALLOW [!] DEV/STAGING --> DB ZONE TCP/3306, TCP/5432 ALLOW [!] DEV/STAGING --> INTERNET * ALLOW [!] DEV/STAGING --> DMZ * DENY VPN GATEWAY --> INTERNAL * ALLOW [!] VPN GATEWAY --> DB ZONE * ALLOW [!] VPN GATEWAY --> MGMT ZONE * ALLOW [!] VPN GATEWAY --> DMZ TCP/22 ALLOW ================================================================================ [!] = FLAGGED: Potential least-privilege violation — review required ================================================================================ KNOWN ISSUES (from last audit 2025-07-15): ------------------------------------------------------------------------- 1. DMZ --> DB ZONE: Direct database access from DMZ violates defense in depth. Web servers in the DMZ should connect to application servers in the INTERNAL zone, which then query the database. A compromised web server currently has direct access to MySQL, PostgreSQL, AND Redis. 2. MGMT ZONE: Has unrestricted access to ALL zones. Management traffic should be limited to SSH (TCP/22), HTTPS (TCP/443), and SNMP (UDP/161). Current rules allow any protocol and port. 3. DB ZONE --> INTERNET: Database servers should NEVER have direct internet access. Outbound traffic should route through a proxy for package updates only. Current rule allows unrestricted egress. 4. INTERNAL --> INTERNET: Unrestricted outbound. Should be limited to HTTP/HTTPS through a proxy, DNS, and NTP at minimum. Allows potential data exfiltration and C2 communication. 5. VPN GATEWAY: VPN users get full access to INTERNAL, DB, and MGMT zones. No segmentation by user role. A compromised VPN account can reach everything. 6. DEV/STAGING --> DB ZONE: Dev/staging servers can reach production databases. This violates environment separation and risks accidental or malicious data access. 7. DEV/STAGING --> INTERNAL: Unrestricted access between dev and production internal networks. Lateral movement from a compromised dev server can reach production systems. 8. No rate limiting on any zone-to-zone traffic. 9. No IDS/IPS inspection between zones. 10. No logging configured on fw-core-01 for denied or allowed traffic. ================================================================================